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Introduction 
Everyday many different people read books, see movies, and view works of art.  
After these experiences they may be moved to feel a wide array of different emotions. If 
we were to approach someone as they left a viewing of Titanic with tears streaming down 
their face and tell them the sadness that they are feeling at the moment is not truly 
genuine, then these people would respond to us with confusion or perhaps even laughter. 
Perhaps instead, we could inform them, that their feelings are merely quasi-emotions. 
Although I do not think this would serve to allay their confusion. The thought that those 
emotions are not genuine is so foreign to what they are feeling that at least initially it 
cannot be taken seriously. However, the concept of quasi-emotions in regards to fictions 
has become the commonplace position in philosophical circles as of late. This surge in 
the popularity of the quasi-emotional view is due to the so called Paradox of Fiction. 
This paradox relies on some case studies in which our emotional responses to fiction do 
not parallel our responses in the real world. Philosophers have used these specific cases 
in order to motivate the change from accepting emotions in regards to fictions to their 
current position. However, in considering such a small set of fictions and examples I 
believe a key component to these fictional emotions has been overlooked. By 
reexamining this issue I believe the original woes can be assuaged.  Specifically, through 
an examination of emotions originating in video game fictions we can see how the 
participants in imaginings may have genuine emotions within the context of the fiction. 
This solution may bear weight in the argument of whether or not our emotions in regards 
to fictions are in fact genuine. In this paper I will investigate the emotional phenomenon 
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and philosophy’s break from the intuitive position of accepting these emotions as 
genuine. I begin, in my first chapter, by explaining the cases that originally motivated the 
position that philosophers have now adopted.  Then in chapter two I will advocate for J. 
David Velleman’s theory of how we interact with video games through our avatar. In 
addition, I will define our specific relationship with these avatars. Finally, I will show 
how using these avatars we can see how our emotions in video games are genuine 
because of their special relation to us. This case study of video games will show how we 
might relate to other fictional works and why in all cases our emotions are genuine. 
Overall my task will protect the intuitive position and show why the original cases can be 
better and more intuitively explained with genuine emotions. 
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The Paradox of Fiction 
As you read Shakespeare’s Othello you read of Desdemona being smothered by 
our tragic protagonist Othello. You seemingly feel a number of emotions: sadness at her 
death, hatred at Iago for his treachery, and pity for Othello because of what he has been 
tricked into doing. These emotions seem natural to us; they arise without our willing 
them or even wanting them to do so.  When something scares us our heart races in 
anticipation of what might happen. We feel what it is like to be afraid. We may even go 
as far to say that people who do not feel these emotions are being “cold” or “do not 
understand the depths of the story.” The phenomenon of experiencing emotions with 
regards to compelling fictions is so ubiquitous that we consider it odd to not engage with 
fictions in these ways. However, there is something very unique about these emotions; 
they do not seem to originate in anything similar to what their real world counterparts do. 
When I am afraid of a tiger there is something to be afraid of in a real sense, but being 
scared while watching The Ring does not seem to track the real world in the same way. In 
one case you have survival at stake and in the other nothing at all.  In describing what 
makes emotions genuine and rational philosophers have appealed to the idea that the 
target of our emotional state must be a real one. Therefore, these philosophers argue that 
our emotional states as they relate to fictions cannot be genuine emotions. Rather they are 
referred to by names like quasi-emotions or imagined emotions in order to show their 
non-genuine status. This issue has been described as the Paradox of Fiction where we 
have these emotions originating in fictions, but at the same time they seem to be 
substantially different from our normal everyday emotional responses.  
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 The original motivating force behind the paradox is based in the break of 
connection between emotions and cognition in the case of fictions.  The argument comes 
in two different cases. The first argues from a position of reasonable responses, and the 
second relies on the persistence of emotions tracking the reality of their targets. Let us 
first consider Othello as presented above. We feel many complex emotions but we do not 
feel the motivations that we would if this happened in real life. In the context of the play 
we do not feel the urge to rush on stage and prevent Desdemona’s death, nor do we 
attempt to catch Iago for his horrible actions. Kendall L. Walton makes use of a similar 
example in his book Mimesis as Make-Believe. He recounts the scene of watching a scary 
movie in a dark room when a monster comes onto the screen. You, the viewer, feel very 
afraid, but you don’t call the police or flee the room for fear of the monster.1 These two 
examples demonstrate how our motivations in regards to certain fictional emotions2 
differ significantly from their real life correlates. The argument claims that if these 
emotional states are the same as the ones we feel in everyday life they should lead to the 
same kinds of actions. Because they do not lead to these actions; therefore the fictional 
emotions must differ from real emotions in some significant way. 
Colin Radford in his work, “How Can we be Moved by the Fate of Anna 
Karenina?” introduced another case demonstrating an interesting difference between 
fictional emotions and real emotions. In this case Radford asks us to imagine an old man 
in a bar: the man describes the worrying state of his child who has undergone some 
terrible strife. As you are caught up by the story you pity the man and his child for the 
1 Walton Mimesis as Make Believe P. 246 
2 I will follow Gendler and Kovakovich in referring to our emotions about fictions as “fictional emotions.” 
This term does not mean emotions of the fiction itself unless otherwise noted. 
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sorrow that has befallen them. Shortly thereafter the man laughs and says that he has no 
child and it is all just a fiction. Suddenly, we are no longer pitying the man and his child 
rather we may become angry at the man for lying to us.  We feel duped and may go as far 
to yell at this man who we feel has cheated us. As soon as the target of our pity was 
known to be a fictional our emotions dissipate.  This example falls even closer to home 
when considering the scandal involving the work Three Cups of Tea by Greg Mortenson. 
The story recounts a harrowing tale of Mortenson’s travels through Pakistan and 
Afghanistan and building schools for girls there. It was a book that moved many people 
to the plight of young women in the Middle East and was originally advertised with the 
line “Greg Mortenson represents the best of America. He’s my hero. And after you 
read Three Cups of Tea, he’ll be your hero, too.”3 However, after several years an 
investigation concluded that many of the claims and stories Mortenson told in the original 
work were false. Sympathy for Mortenson and the specific characters of his work turned 
to hatred overnight. That is to say, upon learning that the target of our emotions was not 
real we immediately discounted or lost our emotional state. However in the case of 
fictions we know that the target is not real from the beginning.  How then, the argument 
asks, can we have genuine emotions in relation to fictional targets? Through this 
argument we can see that the paradox of fiction can only be solved for accounting why 
some non-real targets allow for emotions while others do not. 
A formal formulation of this paradox was created by Gendler and Kovakovich, 
who attempt to protect the genuineness of our emotions in regards to fictions. They boil it 
down to an inconsistent triad: 
3 U.S. Representative Mary Bono (R-Calif.) 
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“1 We have genuine and rational emotional responses towards F; 
2 We believe that F is purely fictional; 
3 In order for us to have genuine and rational emotional responses towards 
a character (or situation), we must not believe that the character (or 
situation) is purely fictional”4 
These three positions cannot be simultaneously maintained.  Philosophers continue to 
claim that there is a dissonance between cognitive knowledge and emotional response 
that we do not normally observe.5 The position of many philosophers at the moment is to 
drop the first proposition. This position is held by Kendall Walton who argues that our 
emotions in relation to fictions are merely quasi emotions, or Colin Radford who argues 
that the emotions are irrational. A potential second but unpopular position would be to 
reject the second proposition. This would work around the idea that we do not really 
know fictions are entirely fictional. Finally, it is possible to reject the third and attempt to 
account for the cases that originally motivated by the paradox. However, we must first 
understand the requirements of the third position.  What it means to be rational in this 
context is that the emotions can be a part of a system that works towards an end goal.  
That is to say a system that involves emotions must be able to act towards a final future 
target which has value to the actor. This will be a working and simple definition of 
rationality for the context of this paper. Simply, put rationality means the actor is 
successfully employing an ends:means relationship between their actions and their 
desires. 
Walton motivates his rejection of the first proposition by arguing that our 
emotions in relation to fictions are merely quasi emotions. Specifically he argues that to 
4 Gendler and Kovakovich P. 242 
5 Gendler and Kovakovich P. 245 
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experience emotions we must have two specific conditions met.  We must experience the 
phenomenological components of the emotion, and we must know or believe that we are 
having an emotion towards a real and appropriate target.6 Walton accepts that fictions 
and our involvement therein are sufficient to create the phenomenological states involved 
with the relevant emotions. However, because we have sufficient knowledge that the 
targets of such states are not real the emotions themselves do not meet the second 
condition of having a real or genuine target.7 Walton also argues that we understand that 
we are not in fact feeling the emotions in a true sense; rather he contends that we are 
aware that our emotions are not fully what we would expect of them in other 
circumstances. He uses these factors as evidence that the emotions themselves are not full 
emotions but rather a kind of quasi emotion. 
Walton himself provides a defense of why quasi-emotions are rational in these 
situations however.  He argues that, in so far as these quasi-emotions motivate us towards 
safer actions or are used in calculating the best option in a scenario, the emotions 
themselves are required as a part of our evaluative judgments. Then, these quasi emotions 
could be useful in evaluating hypothetical scenarios that we might use to do prior 
calculations. Therefore, Walton argues that the emotions are rational as they fit into the 
ends:means framework of rationality.8 For example when I am in the jungle trying to 
survive it would be beneficial to my survival if, while in the safety of camp, I could 
consider a situation where a tiger is attacking me. If in this hypothetical situation 
however I cannot experience fear, then I may make the sub optimal calculation of my 
6 Walton Mimesis as Make-Believe P. 244 
7 Walton Fearing Fictions P. 7 
8 Walton Mimesis as Make-Believe P. 245 
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available options.  In this way having a quasi-emotion motivates me in the appropriately 
optimal way such that when I am in the situation I need not go through all of the 
calculations, and I can rely on remembering the previously optimal choice.  Through this 
argumentation Walton has simply argued that the issues with fictional emotions cause 
them to be non-genuine but preserves their ability to serve a rational purpose.  
A popular option when non-philosophers are faced with this problem is to assert 
that we get lost in the moment. In fact Radford brings up this concept of us falling into 
the fiction and forgetting that the targets of our emotions are really fictional. This more 
intuitive approach I believe would work something like the following example. Before 
we read a book we understand that its contents are fictional but then as we read it we 
forget that the book itself is not a true account. Then as we read we begin to feel real 
emotions in regards to these characters that we would not feel if we were not “lost” in the 
book forgetting that these characters are not real. As soon as we realize that we are in fact 
reading a fiction those emotions should dissipate entirely. However, this theory seems 
odd as it does not solve the problem of why we respond so differently to these fictional 
emotions. One would think that if we really thought that the protagonist of a fictional 
story about a shooting in our neighborhood was true we would take different responses 
like trying to catch the killer or at least calling the police to inform them of the details.  
Of course, once we put the book down and realized that it was in fact a fiction these 
motivations may also dissipate but I do not believe that we ever feel those motivations in 
the first place. Rather, we think something like I’m terrified of what is going on in this 
book. 
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Gendler and Kovakovich reject the third proposition, which they refer to as the 
coordination condition.  They argue that the significant similarities between fictional 
emotions and regular emotions justify us considering them in the same camp.  In other 
words, the differences between fictional emotions and real emotions are not significantly 
large to damage our perception of fictional emotions to this degree. They cite recent 
scientific evidence that found emotions serve a necessary purpose in decision making.  
They use this evidence in order to promote the rationality of emotions along Walton’s 
theoretical argumentation. Therefore, in hypothetical situations the ability to feel things 
exactly akin to those things that we would feel in the real world is a necessary component 
of their rationality.  They also believe that this scientific evidence offers a need for these 
hypothetical emotions to mirror our normal emotions as precisely as possible.  This they 
believe is good enough reason to believe that our fictional emotions are as genuine as our 
real emotions. This argument relies on us believing that simply because our hypothetical 
judgments would be improved by the similarity of fictional emotions to real emotions 
that they are indistinguishable. However, Gendler and Kovakovich lack a compelling 
philosophical argument against the third proposition.  Rather they attempt to show that 
other rejections are inappropriate and cite some scientific evidence as a compelling 
reason to push us to thinking that the third condition is the one that should be dropped 
from the triad.  
In response to Walton’s worry about the reference of genuine emotional targets 
Gendler and Kovakovich argue that we feel emotions for other similar non-existential 
targets.  Primarily they argue that we feel real emotions in regards to targets that are 
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temporally offset from our current position.9 For example, we may feel pity for the 
people who have to live in a world affected by global warming. In this case we are having 
seemingly real emotions for imagined people.  That is to say we do feel pity for those 
people.  In fact these emotions may even go as far to motivate us to change our actions in 
the current time. Although this argument seems sturdy against the argument of 
rationality, I do not think it will convince Walton to change his position. These people are 
in fact imagined and we have no proof of even their existence therefore what we feel are 
the same quasi-emotions as before. They are still separate in Walton’s important sense 
from our current reality. 
Derek Matravers critiques some of this position in his paper “The Challenge of 
Irrationalism, and How Not to Meet It”. He argues two separate arguments one against 
individual circumstances of emotions and the other against protecting the system as a 
whole. First he argues, that if we protect the rationality of emotions through a defense of 
the entire emotional system, as Walton, Gendler and Kovakovich do, we fall prey to 
making any such emotion rational. Because in making a blanket defense for any 
emotional state may bring in too many different emotions as rational. His argument finds 
that if we call fictional emotions rational just because they are a result of a system that is 
sometimes useful we include too much. That is to say by appealing to this kind of 
argument we make every possible emotion rational as it is the result of a rationally based 
system.  This obviously seems incorrect as we should certainly want to say being afraid 
of drinking water without some very odd circumstances is an irrational fear, for example. 
Second, Matraver’s goes about making an argument against protecting individual 
9 Gendler and Kovakovich P. 249 
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instances of fictional emotions by claiming that defending rationality in this way commits 
one to the following, “If a person performs action Φ, believing that Ψ will likely result – 
and no other agency is involved – then, if Ψ does result, that person is deemed not merely 
responsible for Ψ, but to have performed action Ψ.”10 This means that in reading a book 
which may allow us to enter into a wide variety of hypothetical scenarios, which we use 
to prepare for the real world, we subsequently protect the results of imagining these 
scenarios (Eg. fictional emotions). However, as Matravers argues these would have to be 
predictable and useful hypothetical situations. Unfortunately, as he also points out, many 
of the fictions we engage in lack in any real similarity to our own lives, nor do they 
provide us with overarching moral lessons that we may use in the future. Matravers 
claims that we may have protected the rationality of some fictional emotions, ones that 
are specifically useful to us, but a whole host of them remain irrational. For example, if 
we are reading a book about knights in shining armor saving damsels in distress, then, 
Matravers argues, that this would only be rational in the case that I had something to gain 
from what I could learn in the tale. Matravers then continues that a weakening of the 
principle to include any subjective reasons that the agent may have is a viable option; 
however, because it is not necessarily reality tracking he does not find it compelling. This 
is a concerning point if it were true because it would be a large cost to our theory if we 
were required to call all possible emotional responses rational.   
Walton, Gendler and Kovakovich deal with Matravers’ worry by protecting the 
system of emotions by way of requiring their use in various hypothetical judgments and 
citing them as a result of pleasure seeking desires.  In doing this they allow these kinds of 
10 Matravers 259 
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situations to be separated into two categories appropriate and inappropriate emotional 
responses. Let us return to the fear of water in a hypothetical scenario.  Here the fact that 
the target is drinking water alone would not classify it as an appropriate emotion. Rather 
we would need either more information about the clown, for instance his status as a 
murderer, or more information about the person, namely having been assaulted by a 
number of clowns.  In the pursuit of fictions we subjectively desire to place ourselves as a 
part of a fictional world.  Therefore, we are seeking to be as like ourselves acting in the 
real world in these fictional worlds.  In so far as this is the case experiencing emotions is 
a requirement of experiencing those worlds properly and achieving our goal of pleasure. 
Either way we have escaped the irrationality of the base case itself and shown how 
appealing to the beneficial effect of these emotions can protect us in appropriate 
circumstances with regards to fictions as well. 
My worry is that the examples used and relied upon in all of these cases are rather 
limited in a fictional sense.  In addition I believe that a consideration of a broader variety 
of examples will enable us to pinpoint exactly why the third condition should be dropped 
from the triad. They rely on sharp contrast between the fiction and the consumer of 
fiction but surely that does not constitute the entirety of fictions. Walton touches upon 
this briefly in his consideration of how someone can convey in a fictional game that their 
character is feeling a certain way. Walton states that: 
“The fact that fictionally Charles believes himself endangered by the slime and has a 
normal desire not to be harmed implies that fictionally his behavior is subject to the 
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relevant motivational pressure, that fictionally he is inclined to try to escape the slime, 
even though he is not actually so inclined.”11 
Here we see the limits of considering such a small set of examples.  In this fiction Charles 
himself is not a character and therefore fictionally he cannot take any such actions. It is 
unclear whether Charles does not feel inclined because the emotion is non-genuine or 
rather because the situation is entirely out of his control. The absoluteness of the paradox 
of fiction comes from the limitedness of the examples considered. Even Colin Radford 
belies an interesting point near the end of his paper saying, “perhaps we are and can be 
moved by the death of Mercutio only to the extent that, at the time of the performance, 
we are ‘caught up’ in the play.”12 At certain moments we become part of the play.  We 
are so involved with what is happening on stage we seem to become a passive observer 
inside the fiction itself. This happens much more so in a play where the third person 
position is maintained, while being harder in literature where we see exactly as the author 
wants us to.  Therefore, I believe a consideration of a broader selection of fictions will 
prove to show how the paradox of fiction is indeed a limited one. This broader selection 
will focus specifically on investigating video games as fictions.  These will allow us to 
delve into how exactly the consumer of the fiction interacts with the imaginative world 
and why it is that our emotions are genuine. 
11 Walton Mimesis as Make-Believe P. 246 
12 Radford P. 78 
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Me and My Avatar 
 A woman canoes down a river at night time passing by several river 
homes and a beach.  There does not seem to be anyone around at the outset; simply a 
woman traveling on the water. Suddenly, a menu pops up and the woman begins to fly up 
from the canoe to travel over the beach town she is near. What originally seems like a 
normal everyday scene has become something fantastic.  The player, sitting in her chair at 
the computer, has been narrating the actions during the duration talking about what “she” 
is doing in the game Second Life. She is taking a trip and looking around this new area 
that she has discovered. But how does this player relate to her medium, the canoeing 
woman, within the fictional world? J. David Velleman, a professor of philosophy at 
NYU, has developed his own view of this player:avatar relationship. His view attempts to 
account for the intuitions and actions of video game players. 
Velleman proposes his view about our relationship to our avatars in his paper 
Bodies, Selves. Velleman argues that our avatars act as extensions of our true selves 
within the virtual fiction. He argues for this by citing the tendency for players to refer to 
their actions as their own, the difference between purely imaginative fictions and the 
game fiction, and the similarity between intention-action relationship in both the virtual 
and real worlds. Velleman also attempts to address two of the common objections to his 
view. To properly consider Velleman’s view we must first ascertain what features a 
successful theory of fictional emotions must have. I will argue that there are two 
necessary requirements: an ability to account for the ‘I’ terminology we use and to 
explain the player character action structure. I will then consider an array of positions and 
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display why they fail under these requirements. As we will see, Velleman’s view is a very 
attractive and defensible position overall. 
 The games that Velleman is talking about have some specific features: a persistent 
world, many characters involved, persistent player characters, and a high degree of player 
customization. Some examples of games like this would be Second Life, World of 
Warcraft, or Skyrim.  Perhaps most important is the ability for the players to dictate most 
of the crucial features of their character.  In these games the player has the ability to 
change all of the ways that their character looks and acts as they move throughout the 
world. They can name their characters, decide their gender, and imagine their 
background.  Many of these games had their origin in Dungeons and Dragons styled 
tabletop games which themselves originated in online roleplaying chat rooms, wherein 
people could dictate every facet of their character. This customizability was a crucial 
component to the game, as players could be exactly who they wanted to be and do 
whatever they pleased. These games involve the player’s character being the same 
character every time they play. They may be offline for a long period of time but when 
the player returns their character will remain the same. The player interacts with a 
number of other characters in the game that may be controlled either by the game itself or 
other players. Some events or parts of the world will be controlled by the game. This 
means that much of the world is dictated by its author rather than the player themselves. 
The first condition for a view of the avatar-personal relationship is to explain the 
way people speak about their avatars.  Specifically, when players talk about their actions 
in the virtual context they use the ‘I’ terminology.  Frequently when describing the events 
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taking place players will say, “I did that.” Consider someone sitting down at their 
computer playing World of Warcraft.  When asked what they are doing they may respond: 
“I am playing WoW” or they may respond “I am killing an evil demon.” In this case the 
player has referred to both their “real world” and virtual actions as their own action.  It is 
the player who is playing World of Warcraft, and it is also that same player who is killing 
demons within the game.  When asked about their usage they do not seem to be using the 
‘I’ terminology in a loose sense either. Players report an ability to play a game “as 
someone else,” but they cite that as a separate and distinct experience from what they do 
as their avatars. The ability to account for this commonplace reference to the avatar’s 
actions as one’s own is crucial to a successful theory attempting to explain the 
avatar:player relationship. 
Beth Coleman presents a possible counter example in her work Hello Avatar: Rise 
of the Networked Generation. Coleman interviews a man named Gy, who in his normal 
life is a professional writer, translator, and artist. However, in Second Life1 Gy 
participates in cannibalism. Gy frequently refers to his character in the game Second Life 
as a separate ‘he’ rather than ‘I,’ in his interviews.  However, in his quotes he gives a 
more thorough look at his relationship to his character. He states, “You’re the spectator of 
your life here.”2 Additionally in recounting a story about his playing second life, “It 
really started when I met a girl at the entry to one of these brothels and didn’t enter it. She 
1 A virtual world of the type addressed by Velleman in which players can control all aspects of their 
character, actions, and surrounding context 
2 Coleman 85 Emphasis Added 
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proposed me to play in a (Second Life) snuff movie.”3 Here a player is referring to the 
virtual actions of his avatar as being his own; he goes as far to call it his life in the game. 
I suspect that Gy seeks to distance himself partially in the interview due to the devious 
nature of some of his actions in the virtual world; however, in speaking about his actions 
he belies how players reference their avatars actions as their own. 
The second requirement for a proper view of the avatar-personal relationship is to 
explain the connection between player intentions and virtual actions. Another way of 
looking at this issue is to ask what motivates the progression of the avatar. This 
relationship can be broken down into two sub components.  The first is the nature of 
action for the avatar itself. The second is the connection between the wants and desires of 
the player and the actions of the avatar. In everyday life it is easy to draw the connection 
between an actor’s beliefs and desires to his intentions and subsequent actions; however, 
in the virtual world this is not so simple.  Avatars take actions in the virtual world, but 
actions are the result of intentions or being compelled (either by another actor or natural 
forces).  The avatar itself cannot be said to have beliefs independent of the player, nor can 
it have its own independent desires.  Let’s consider Coleman’s case study of Gy again. 
His avatar was moving past a brothel and did not enter it, and then another avatar asked 
him to be in a snuff movie.  In this case both avatars have taken a number of actions but 
for simplicity’s sake let us solely consider her action of asking him to participate in the 
snuff film.  This is certainly an action undertaken by an avatar.  If we were to re-describe 
the case as having happened in real life we would assert that the other player’s character 
3 Coleman 89 Emphasis Added by myself 
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must have had some reason for asking Gy to be in the snuff film.  Therefore, we would 
say, the woman asking about the snuff film intended to ask him and subsequently did. We 
could then push this questioning back a step, why did she have such an intention? In this 
case we are likely to cite her desires and beliefs about the world. In the virtual context 
however we have no such obvious link for the avatar and her actions. A successful theory 
must explain how and why actions are performed by the avatar and the specific 
relationship those actions have to the player. 
Finally, Velleman cites the differences between purely imaginative games and 
game worlds as evidence that our relationship to the game world is not an authorial one. 
This is an important difference as it relates to the appropriate responses for certain 
emotional situations.  Where in many other fictions the imaginer has absolute knowledge 
and control about all of the fiction, video games differ significantly.  The player is unable 
to change many features of the world, and more importantly they begin by knowing little 
to nothing about the world.  Rather, the player has to develop his knowledge about the 
world that he is playing in and imagining.  This allows players to have genuine desires 
about things in the world and pursue them independent of taking a meta-game approach. 
If the player has no ability to change the world to be a certain way outside of acting 
through his avatar then we have an important connection between the player, their 
desires, and the world as mediated by the avatar.  The ability for parts of the world to be 
out of the player’s authorial control allows for a genuine emotional response as they may 
be truly surprised, or feel as though they are loved outside of things they compelled to 
happen. 
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One possible view argues that the avatar is entirely independent from the player. 
In this case the avatar is to be viewed as being entirely independent from the player 
themselves. The avatar would have its own beliefs and desires independent of the 
player’s. This is not to say that the beliefs and desires would not be affected by the 
player’s but the avatar must be capable of holding these beliefs and desires apart from the 
player. However, this view has a hard time answering the first two conditions. It is forced 
to say in the case of the first condition that we are largely speaking loosely when we 
speak about our avatars. Perhaps we are the ones that created them but they act as their 
own unique entity separate from us. This position is forced to explain our usage of ‘I’ by 
us speaking in a loose sense.  Even then though it is hard to see why we would use ‘I’ at 
all if our avatars were truly separate from ourselves.  It would be similar to the way we 
speak about ourselves in reference to our cars. When I say, “I had a flat tire this morning” 
I reference my car using ‘I’ terminology but not referring to anything that is actually a 
part of myself. It is interesting to note however, that most of the sentential examples 
involving these kinds of objects use the concept of having.  One would hardly say, “I 
wouldn’t start this morning it was too cold out.” So in reference to the avatar it is easy to 
see that we refer to the avatar as an ‘I’ doing rather than myself having. This concept 
works against the idea that avatars are merely vehicles for the player’s actions in the 
world devoid of meaning.  They must mean more or bear a special relationship to us as 
they are not referred to in the same way as everyday objects. This means that the view  at 
least seems to fall at least on its inability to account for why we refer to our avatars in the 
way that we do. On the second condition the view seems more firm, it has a way to 
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account for how the player’s intentions relate to the avatars own actions besides some 
kind of control relationship.  That is to say the player tells the avatar what to do and they 
acquiesce by doing the actions as commanded.  This is not to say that they have a will of 
their own but that as an independent object they are pushed to do something in the way 
that we would push a stone to form a wall. This is a somewhat satisfying position as it 
takes away from the requirement of the avatar to have much personal content.  Finally it 
deals well with the final condition of limiting the avatars control of the world around it 
while allowing the player to have a greater degree of meta game interactions. Overall this 
theory fares okay with the requirements but fails to capture the crucial intuition of how 
players relate to our avatars on such a personal level. 
Apart from the conditions for a successful theory, this view has issues with avatar 
permanence within the virtual world. In most games that use avatars these characters are 
not seen as existing in the world without their player. For example in World of Warcraft 
or Second Life, when the player logs out of the game their character disappears from the 
world. They cease to take actions or gain knowledge about what is happening within the 
game world through their avatar. However, the player can continue to take actions within 
the game world and gain knowledge about the world from other sources than their avatar. 
Consider a game like World of Warcraft in which a player may have any number of 
avatars.  If the player gains knowledge about the world through any of those avatars it 
will then be shared to each other avatar.  This is because players may have multiple 
representations of themselves within any given world. These players may control 
multiple different avatars at different times acting through one of many different avatars. 
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However, the knowledge of these avatars is not confined to the avatar itself.  It would be 
awkward for the player to say that he knows something that his character does not except 
when explaining a game that the avatar was not his own. That is to say in the world of 
games there is no dramatic irony for the player; their knowledge and sentiments are their 
avatars. Another example of this is player’s relationships which are not avatar specific in 
most instances but player specific. While players interact with each other via avatars their 
relationship is not bound by those specific avatars. Players will communicate with one 
another through a variety of avatars maintaining their relationships regardless of how 
they are interacting with the world. If the avatar is entirely independent of the player then 
it will be unable to explain the specific nature of knowledge about the world and 
relationships within the world by citing individual avatars. Rather a view that includes the 
player will be much better suited to these concerns. 
Perhaps a more plausible view involves the avatar acting as a sort of puppet for 
the player.  That is to say within the game the player is masquerading as their avatar. This 
sort of view would claim that the avatar does not have any of its own features except 
perceived appearance in the world. Consider the analogous relationship of a puppeteer 
and their puppet.  As they put the puppet on the stage and take up the strings they exert 
total control of the puppet as it plays across the stage.  All of the puppets movements are 
controlled by the puppeteer and express his will.  In the same way the player could 
extend themselves into a fictional world by exerting absolute control over their puppet in 
a fictional realm. The question at hand is how we should treat this relationship.  I believe 
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there are two possible characterizations of this relationship which will dictate much of the 
debate. I wish to consider each extreme of this possible view. 
First, we could consider the puppet's characteristics and actions dictated by the 
fiction itself. This view is something akin to what happens in a play.  The actor is given a 
script and told who they are. The director and actor have some creative license with the 
role, but they are likely to be considered disingenuous to the original with any major 
changes from the author’s vision. Under these circumstances there is very little of the 
puppeteer or actor coming through.  Consider how we commend actors for their realistic 
portrayals in their roles.  Our commendations may even come in the form, “I entirely 
forgot that this was not real.” What we value here is accurate portrayals of the original 
work and a lack of the actor coming through. 
Although this position is definitely coherent and apt, I do not believe it is the kind 
of view that Velleman claims to explain. This is because it does not require or cause us to 
need the same conditions that we had set out earlier.  There is hardly a usage of the 'I' in 
these cases except when used to say 'I, in my capacity as being Othello.' Additionally, we 
value this kind of actor for a connection between not their own intentions and their 
actions but the author’s intentions or the character's imparted intentions being those that 
are displayed.  
The second extreme involves the actor having total control of their character such 
as in improvisational works. In these cases the actor is constantly deciding what their role 
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would or should be doing.4 The degree to which the actor’s feelings and characteristics 
are imparted to the role are at their own discretion.  In this case the actor is conveying 
much of themselves via their intentions for the role. For example consider an improv 
scene, wherein the actor is pretending to be a fireman.  In this case the actor may or may 
not have decided to portray a firemen, but he certainly can decide what he does in his 
capacity as a fireman. However, their interaction with the role will still be one in which 
they are trying to convey a certain role. That is to say in their role as an actor they are 
attempting to convey a specific role, and any similarity between the role and their own 
character is one of circumstance. 
The essential problem with this actor: role theory of our avatar relationship is that 
it cannot handle the first condition and subsequently must fail one the second condition as 
well. The 'I' that comes through in these acting roles is one constantly cloaked by “in the 
capacity as being x.” For instance the improvisational actor in the example above is likely 
to say, “I in trying to be a fireman did Y.” Or perhaps the actor would claim things like, 
“my character would want to rescue people from this building.” The 'I' in terms of the 
actor is intentionally suppressed in order to better convey the role. Because of this the 
second condition must fall as well. The intentions are not the actors rather the actor’s 
intentions take the form 'I want to be perceived like X so I will do Y.' The related desires 
and knowledge informing these intentions come from wanting to be perceived as X and 
believing that Xs do Y like things. Players may sometimes do this in games but they do it 
4 There is a normative distinction here in fictions that will become important later on in relating to video 
games but I do not think that this is crucial at this point. 
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in the same capacity that people may do in real life. Players may have their avatar take on 
a certain role but this is no different than people do when they take to the stage. However, 
I do not think that this relationship of intentions and actions accurately describes the 
player: avatar relationship. There are times in video games where the avatar may 
undertake an action to its own detriment for the benefit of the player themselves. That is 
to say the avatar may trade away their belongings for no gain, but rather for the gain of 
the player.  Consider when the avatar gives a newly found sword to another avatar of the 
player in order to improve its strength.  This is clearly an action deriving from the 
player’s own intentions rather than the intentions of the avatar, as it would be impossible 
for the avatar to have met the own player’s other avatar. 
Velleman's view by contrast involves a different position where the actor or player 
extends themselves into the fictional realm.  It is the player putting themselves inside of 
the fictional world while maintaining the fictional constraints put in place.  For example 
when a player is playing World of Warcraft there is a specific world that they must fit 
into.  They cannot be James Bond, because the world dictates the time period and what 
kinds of things are going on. This is similar to Walton’s rules in group imaginings where 
there are an agreed upon set of rules for the imagining that all participants must follow. If 
a child is playing pirates with all of his friends and then says that he has a light saber and 
force powers, then in many ways he is not participating in the group imagining.  In this 
case societal pressures may force him to conform or leave the imagining, but in the case 
of avatars the world itself will constrain players' ability to perform certain actions. In this 
way the player is part participant and part author of the fiction itself. 
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There is a small caveat I must make here to this distinction.  It is surely possible 
for certain actor: role relationships to mirror Velleman's view.  This would occur when the 
actor is playing themselves as the role as well. In this case the actor is doing the same as 
the player does in relation to the fiction itself. However, I do not believe that this 
constitutes a threat to Velleman's view because the threats to the actor: role view fall 
away when the role attempted is to be the actor themselves. 
Velleman, by arguing that the avatar is an extension of the self in the virtual 
realm, easily explains the usage of ‘I’ in reference to the avatar. Velleman presents a 
thought experiment to bolster his case.  Imagine yourself playing a game of tennis. As the 
ball flies toward you, what do you think? If you are like me I would imagine your thought 
process goes something like, “I need to hit that ball.” Then I hit the ball. Finally, the ball 
flies away from me. Within this context the ‘I’ terminology is used for the actions taking 
place. This is especially the case when “I hit the ball,” but I personally never touched the 
ball. In fact the only object that touched the ball was the racket. However, in this case the 
racket is acting as an extension of my personal intentions and actions. Another way of 
interpreting this case is to argue that I think something along the lines of the following 
instead: “I need to move my hand such that the racket hits the ball,” “I will move my 
hand in order to move my racket to this angle at this speed with this much resistance in 
order to propel the ball,” and finally do move my hand in the previous manner.  This 
second view presents a much more objective fact based perspective on what happened. 
However, I think in many ways it misrepresents the actor as calculating in ways that seem 
implausible. Another way of posing this issue is to question whether or not we really 
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calculate how our hand must move in order to affect a racket in such a manner.  I suspect 
that any tennis player doing this would find himself far too caught up in the calculations 
to play as well as Federer who simply hits the ball.5 Considering the racket as an 
extension of the self is the reason that we feel more comfortable describing the case in the 
first manner than the second. Therefore, Velleman argues, we treat our avatars in the 
same way as our tennis rackets.  The avatars allow us to extend ourselves into the fiction 
itself and treat it as another world in which we exist. 
Velleman’s strongest point is the intuitive relationship between intentions and 
actions within the virtual world.  Similarly to the real world, the action intention 
relationship in the fiction is preserved.  The player has intentions stated in the following 
manner: “I want to build my house, I want to go over there, etc…” These are no different 
than our everyday intentions in regards to our goals and beliefs. In addition, if Velleman’s 
argument in regards to our usage of first person pronouns is upheld, then these intentions 
are directly causing actions as they do in the real world.  Consider Velleman’s example 
again, the act of a tennis player hitting a ball with his racket.  We think of the tennis 
player as thinking: “I will hit the ball with top spin over the net.” He then proceeds 
through with his intention acting it out in the real world. Of course it is possible that his 
actions will not succeed in achieving his intentions at all times, but there is a direct link 
between his intention and his action. This relationship is maintained in the virtual world.  
The player intends to do something and then does it but this time in the virtual context. 
5 Surely, Federer may think things like I want the ball to go here in this way so that my opponent cannot 
respond; however, this would only further complicate any possible calculations on his part. 
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His real world intention has been translated to the virtual world. Therefore, this thought 
experiment defeats the objection that the player must use a medium and therefore does 
not genuinely interact with the virtual world himself. 
 Frequently opponents of this view will here object that there are many reported 
cases of avatars being unlike the player themselves or expressing attitudes that the player 
themselves would not.  For example, an older man could be playing a game in the form 
of a young girl or someone who is very kind and charitable in the real world will play a 
sadistic domineering crook in the virtual world.  Coleman’s example of Gy fits this 
possible description.  Gy explains that he lives a normal everyday boring life which has 
no real degree of fetishization. However, in Second Life6 Gy participates in cannibalism.  
In the game he and his cohorts regularly stew people alive, roast them on spits, and 
asphyxiate other players. The group then proceeds to virtually gorge themselves on the 
corpse.7 Here we are presented with a player who in real life acts one way and in the 
virtual context seemingly very differently. The opponent asserts, if we are the ones really 
acting in the world we cannot account for such a large discrepancy between real life and 
fictional actions.  However, this dichotomy though odd is not unique to the fictional 
environment. Many times we hear reports of perfectly normal charity workers being 
heavy metal heads rocking out every weekend.  When their coworkers hear this they may 
be shocked but surely we are not inclined to call part of his life non-genuine in a 
6 A virtual world of the type addressed by Velleman in which players can control all aspects of their 
character, actions, and surrounding context 
7 Coleman 87 
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metaphysical sense.  Perhaps we may assert that in every day interactions we may say 
that he is acting. However, as Velleman asserts, this should cause us no more pause in the 
virtual space than it does in the real sense. Though we may be put off by someone 
seeming very duplicitous that does not cause us to think of those actions as not their own. 
Therefore, although this may seem odd to us it alone does not cause a serious issue for 
Velleman’s view. 
Now that I have established the view of how we relate to our avatars in these 
games we can investigate what implications this will have on the paradox. By having the 
player’s avatar as an extension of the self into the fictional realm we can better account 
for the original cases presented and see certain other advantages that were not earlier 
considered in the debate. 
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Video Games and Our Emotional Responses 
 Now that we have considered the background of how we interact with our avatars 
let us return to the paradox of fiction. The paradox looms large behind the players of 
various games. If readers feel threatened by their emotions being called non-genuine 
when they’ve spent a few days reading a novel, then imagine how impacted players feel 
after pouring months of time and emotional energy into their virtual lives. However, 
considering Velleman’s argument for our relation to our avatars should these readers and 
players really feel threatened? I think not, rather Velleman offers us an explanation of 
how the targets of our emotions are real within the context of the game. In this chapter I 
will argue that some previous solutions to the paradox are unfulfilling in many ways.  
Namely I will address both Walton’s attack on the genuineness of our fictional emotions 
and Radford’s attack on their rationality. I will then show that because of our relationship 
to our avatars being of the manner that Velleman describes we can reject the idea that for 
our emotions to be genuine they must have a real thing as their target.  I will do this by 
looking at the way we interact with these emotional targets and show that their 
interactions track with Velleman’s theory. This will allow me to first show that at least in 
regards to video games the paradox falls away. I will then argue that the solution as it 
applies to video games can be generalized across all fictions when using the same 
contextual involvement. 
I want to begin by introducing a concept that I will be relying on of the “level” of 
a fiction. In many ways our involvement with fictions becomes a hierarchal relationship. 
Our everyday life exists on f0 where we are not involved in any kind of fictional world. 
However, when we are consuming a fiction be it a book, play or video game we place an 
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extension of ourselves into that fiction. This leaves us existing on both f1 and f0, where 
my extension holds my place in the sub fiction.  There is no reason that this could not go 
on infinitely although I think cases of it extending past f2 seem rather rare and incoherent. 
By examining this hierarchy we can consider how we are interacting within each level of 
fictionality and see what is true fictionally on those given levels. 
 Walton’s argument for the fictional emotions being non-genuine or quasi 
emotions falls because it fails to consider ways in which the observer could have real 
targets for their emotions in a fiction.  To briefly rehash his argument he claims that for 
an emotion to be genuine it requires two components: the phenomenological features of 
that emotion and a target that is appropriate for that emotional state. He argues that in the 
case of fictions our targets are always inappropriate as they do not constitute any serious 
relationship to us on our level.  However, in this argument Walton only uses two primary 
examples, both of which assume that the consumer of fiction is a passive and uninvolved 
observer. In these cases it becomes very hard to see what exactly the observer is doing or 
where they are involved in the fictional world. Walton’s troubling position for the player 
however points us to one interesting and helpful characteristic of Velleman’s theory in 
prescribing rules for the imagining. 
If we consider video games as a case study it becomes much easier to see how the 
observer may become a part of this fictional universe and assuage Walton’s worries. All 
consumers of fictions participate in those fictions by imagining in the ways that Walton 
argues in his work Mimesis as Make-Believe.  Walton describes this participation in terms 
of group imaginings. He claims that in group imaginings we, the players, collude on a set 
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of rules about what particularly is to be imagined by the group. These rules ensure that 
everyone is having the same kind of imagining in the important respects. In Walton’s 
terms, video games simply provide these imaginary boundaries through lore and what is 
shown on screen. Therefore, everyone that is playing the game at that moment is being 
prescribed the same rules for the group imagining. An essential part of these rules for all 
fictions is the degree to which the consumer of the fiction is allowed to interact with the 
world. For example, in video games the player is usually limited to the powers of their 
avatar. This provides us with an answer to why when scared the player does not flee the 
area or when witnessing a murder does not call the police. The game, which the player 
has extended themselves into, has rules against these kinds of actions.  For example, if we 
are playing a game in which an evil demon bursts from the ground threatening to kill all 
of humanity. When this happens in the real world we would expect people to feel an 
immense amount of fear and turn to run. In the game however this fear motivates the 
character to draw his weapon and attack.  How then do we account for the radical break 
in the motivating force of these actions? Simple, to take the first set of actions would not 
be to play the game the player is governed by the rules of the fiction. They are not a 
normal person but a hero in charge of saving the world. This difference accounts for the 
difference in the motivating element of their emotions.  Taking note of how these 
fictional rules will influence possible motivations is crucial to my theory. The rules of a 
fiction can and should be expected to change the way we respond to a number of 
situations.  
In a similar way the consumer of fiction actually becomes a part of the imagining 
along parallel ways as we observe in video games. Let us return to the first example of 
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the paradox where we are witnessing the death of Desdemona. The challenge asks us why 
we do not rush the stage and attempt to save her. However, in becoming part of the 
imagining we have opted out of such actions. To do that would be wrong in the context of 
the fiction, we were not characters in Shakespeare’s work, nor would it be appropriate for 
the other players in our imaginative game. Walton has provided the way for the target of 
our emotions to become genuine to us in the context of our being involved with fiction.  
We have placed ourselves in a context in which the fictional world itself prevents us from 
taking certain actions, lest we break the fiction entirely, but this same context enables us 
to consider the other imaginative characters at the level of our extension. Similar to what 
Radford said, if you are really involved with the fiction in the appropriate way then you 
have given yourself appropriate targets for your emotions. Therefore, I do not feel as 
though Walton’s solution for the inconsistent triad holds water, because there are times 
where our emotions towards a fiction are genuine and rational. 
 I believe I responded to much of Radford’s argument in the first chapter. He 
argued that our emotions in regards to fictions were inherently irrational because they 
lack certain motivational features. However, as was previously argued we can protect the 
rationality of these emotions by making a claim about the utility of the overall emotional 
system and by appealing to the subjective value of consuming fictions appropriately. 
Nonetheless, I wish to make one more note on the basis of the relationship to the virtual 
world that I have just described. There is now a greater appeal to the rationality of these 
fictional emotions than just trying to defend the fictional emotive system overall. With 
the player participating as a member of the imagining itself the player now relies on real 
emotions to motivate actions at that time in place that have ramifications exactly similar 
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to real life. Consider the involvement of emotions as a component in rational 
motivations.1 If while playing a game that presents me with hypothetical scenarios I am 
unable to treat these emotions as genuine rational parts of my motivational structure then 
I am left with imperfect actions. At the very least if I am to use irrational emotions then 
my choices will themselves be irrational within the fictional context.  However, if these 
decisions are exactly parallel to what I would do in real life it seems as though they 
should not be irrational.  Consider a situation in which you are playing a game where you 
are chased by a murderer down the street.  In this scenario your fear motivates you to run 
as fast as possible away from the murderer. Surely I would have the same kind of 
response in a fictional scenario.  However, if the base emotion that is motivating this 
action is irrational it is hard to see how my final action can be declared rational. This 
leaves Radford’s argument in an awkward place.  Either he must deny use of emotions in 
the rational process entirely, deny that players have any care or intentions relative to the 
fiction, or accept that in certain fictional contexts at least emotions are rational.  I think 
the first two options bear far too much cost and have too much evidence against their 
being true to accept. This leaves Radford’s argument defeated. 
 I want to start with two base cases for the examination of emotions in the game 
context. Let us consider a player named Theresa sitting at her computer playing a game. 
For the first case: in the game her character is defeating a villain intent on destroying the 
world.  In the course of the fight one of Theresa’s favorite characters dies for good. At 
this time, let us presume for simplicity’s sake that this character is not being controlled by 
another player as that will serve to complicate the intuitions. At that moment she feels sad 
1 Castelfranchi 
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that the character is gone for good. Not only does she lament her own loss but for the 
character’s death in and of itself.  Theresa herself feels affected by the death in that 
moment. For the second case: she (that is her character) is travelling in a dangerous part 
of the world and gets attacked by a creature much stronger than her that seems intent on 
killing her. In that moment she feels a strong sense of fear and a rush of adrenaline 
courses through her veins.  She feels compelled to have her character run away as fast as 
she can. These two cases will provide us with enough content to understand the power of 
adopting Velleman’s position in regards to our avatar. 
 In the first case Theresa is participating in the fiction itself.  She has extended 
herself into the fictional world.  She observes the world through this extension, her 
character’s eyes. As such the death takes place on that extension’s level (f1).  This 
extension of her inside of the world is related to the character at the same level that we 
would be related to the death of anyone in our own world. The avatar itself and all of the 
things it interacts with are of this level f1.  This means that they relatively have a similar 
level of relationship as we do to f0 like things.  Theresa feels these emotions because of 
this relationship between her avatar, the extension of herself, and the parts of the world 
affecting her avatar.  
One might object here that the level of emotions felt by Theresa would be 
different from that of the avatar or of us in the avatar’s situation. However, there is no 
need for these emotions to be at the same level of vivacity as we would normally expect 
of someone in the real world. The avatar may feel the appropriate level of sadness for the 
loss; however, as it is not entirely constitutive of Theresa the loss may not loom so large 
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in her life. To require that Theresa feel some absolute level of emotion in relation to the 
fiction also seems an odd requirement. We do not make such allowances in real emotions, 
so why should we place one here? If you have witnessed the death of an animal and do 
not feel more than 10 sadness units about it should we say that you are in fact only quasi-
sad? I think this example displays a key point of trying to say that Theresa may not feel 
the emotion enough to qualify as a real emotion.  It is unclear what happens when 
Theresa quits the game however. Is she simply remembering the sadness she once felt or 
persisting in feeling the loss despite her lack of involvement in the fiction? This will 
surely have to deal with whether or not the extension is persistent or simply momentary. 
Nevertheless she is certainly made sad by something that is real to her in the context of 
the game, and as long as that context is persistent she is experiencing something relative 
to herself in an important and genuine way. This first case deals with the original worry 
that we do not have appropriate targets for our emotions by showing how we have targets 
in the same manner as we do in everyday life through our avatar relationships. 
The second case proves more interesting, when Theresa is afraid of something 
attacking her avatar she feels fear. In the context of the game she turns to run, as we 
would expect of a person in the real life parallel circumstance. Her character is being 
pursued and under real threat, within its context, of death. Unlike in the quintessential 
scary movie example the player or partaker of the fiction does take actions appropriate to 
the emotions that she is feeling. The context of the video game has provided us the ability 
to see what consumers of fiction would do if they could.  However, we need to account 
for why they do not do this in all possible circumstances, namely the scary movie or 
while watching Othello. The answer here was referenced earlier, in interacting with the 
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fiction we opt to govern ourselves by the rules of the given fiction. Therefore, it is not 
that the emotions do not have the appropriate motivational forces when originating in 
fictions rather it is that we on the f0 level compel ourselves not to act upon them. In 
certain cases we may even fail to do so.  Consider the case of young children or perhaps 
even ourselves watching a terrifying movie, the watcher may cover their eyes and ears 
and shut themselves away from the screen. This action is effectively trying to remove 
their interaction on the f1 level.  This compulsion to run may become so bad in certain 
cases that the consumer of fiction turns of the movie, shuts of the game, or puts down the 
book.  The emotions have served their purpose of contextually motivating her movement 
away from the threat. As soon as either the threat has been evaded or she stops playing 
the game then the fear dissipates. But while it did exist the fear had a rational purpose: 
motivating the protection of the extension of herself within the fictional context. This 
provides us with a rational use for these emotions in regards to fictions.  
Therefore, the paradox of fiction is left in an awkward position. We certainly still 
have the inconsistent triad but it does not seem that the removal of either 1 or 2 will be 
effective. This leaves us to think that there is an error in the 3rd option.  Perhaps, prong 
three of the inconsistent triad is simply too broad. It asserts that our fictional emotions are 
not genuine because of a few specific complex cases.  However, when the relationship in 
the triad is reinvestigated through video games we see that there are at least some cases 
where our fictional emotions are in fact genuine. Therefore instead of just denying the 
ability to have genuine and rational emotive responses we have found a way that the 
participator of a fiction to be genuinely involved. Through the use of their avatar in the 
video game we can see how part of the player not only exists in the fictional world, but 
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also how that player participates at the level of the fiction itself. This gives us a revised 
version of the third proposition: 
3 In order for us to have genuine and rational emotional 
responses towards a character (or situation), we must 
interact with that character (or situation) at the same 
fictional level which it resides at. 
However, if we look at the restatement we can see that it does not necessarily bind itself 
to video games.  Rather it simply requires our activity at a certain fictional level. By 
examining certain thought experiments we can construct a position that will generalize 
back to other fictions as well by considering our personal interaction with their fictional 
worlds. In addition this will allow us to explain our inaction in certain situations and 
provide us with genuine targets for our emotional states in all fictional cases. 
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Conclusion: The Case for Generalization 
Simply by showing how the player related to their avatar was able to protect video 
games from the triad we have opened up the ability to protect all fictions against the 
paradox. If we were involved in other  fictions in a similar fashion to avatars in video 
games we could explain how these emotions are genuine and rational. This view will 
involve our avatar like involvement with other fictions as well. It will deal with the 
original cases that were presented as motivations for the paradox, but it will commit us to 
an awkward sense of fictional involvement in some cases. 
In order to generalize we have to involve the consumer of fiction in a more 
serious way.  This would look something like the following. The reader of Anna 
Karenina rather than just being an exterior uninvolved reader of the story the reader 
becomes a kind of ethereal character in the tale. This leaves them in a fly on the wall 
perspective that is governed by the rules of the fiction in which they are participating. 
The most important rule being that they take no actions to influence the story. The reader 
may feel motivations or desires about what should happen from the perspective of the 
story; however, they are prevented from acting by the fiction itself.  This in turn tempers 
our desires. This seems to track well with how we advance in our consumption of 
fictions. Originally when we are young we have very strong urges for the story to have 
gone differently.  Then as we consume more and more fictions we understand that the 
world has to be as the author wrote it for the fiction’s own value and because we lack the 
ability to affect the outcome.  
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I wish to look into the nature of this possible relationship within the context of 
certain fictions. The consumer of fiction places themselves inside of the imagination in an 
observational capacity, but they are prescribed certain rules by the fiction itself as to what 
they are able to do. In books, depending on the perspective of the narrator, readers can 
only make judgments and assertions about the world as they normally have access to all 
other information and little capability to affect the world itself.  Therefore, they undertake 
the job of imagining the world with the restrictions of the author’s words. They then 
reside as a fly on the wall to these imaginings, wishing perhaps that they could change 
what was happening.  However, due to the rules of the fiction they are prevented from 
doing so. It would hardly be Tolstoy’s book if I could rewrite the ending. Therefore the 
conflict as it was originally presented between my emotions and lack of action does not 
really exist.  It is not that I feel unmotivated to move because my emotions themselves 
are not genuine but rather because implicitly I have been told regardless of what I do I 
cannot change what happens. My actions will be fruitless and in a very real sense likely 
to have a significant social cost. Surely, people watching a play with me would be upset 
if I rushed on stage to save Romeo. I would have broken the rules of the fiction. 
Consider the fiction Ana Karenina in the moments where Levin asks Kitty to 
marry him and her subsequent refusal. The reader feels wrought with distraught at the 
moments in which Kitty says no and desires to question her motivations at that moment. 
However, the reader has been placed by Tolstoy as a passive omniscient third-party 
observer. Although the reader certainly has motivations: to ask Kitty why and to try and 
persuade her otherwise, they are prevented from doing so by their inherent role in the 
fiction. Nonetheless, the characters bear a special relation to their point of view as 
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someone partaking in an observation of the world. Similar to before when the book is 
closed the querying stops left to be undertaken at a later date. The fictional world is 
frozen in time, but so is the reader’s observing extension.  
However, this position has some rather awkward outcomes. Consider a fiction in 
which it is central to the world that something was never observed. For example a book 
in which it is crucial to the plotline that no one who saw some occurrence lived. In this 
case the consumer of the fiction was there in a capacity sufficient to make his emotions 
genuine and did live to potentially tell the tale. Therefore, the consumer of the fiction has 
broken the inherent rules of the fiction, he has disagreed with the author. In this case I 
believe the view has to appeal to the author speaking loosely in some ways.  However, 
this seems unsatisfying. 
Another potential problem with this theory is the high degree of involvement of 
the consumer of the fiction. When an especially gruesome murder scene is described in a 
book this theory would place the reader in the room observing everything.   This may 
make the reader uncomfortably close to what is happening in the novel. However, I 
believe this may account for why some readers simply do not continue reading these 
books. Although this does not track with how close we intuitively feel to these fictions. 
Many times people consume fiction without putting a high degree of focus or imaginative 
involvement into the fiction and it is hard to see how they would be captured by this 
theory. 
We are left in a situation where we must deny that for us to have genuine rational 
emotional responses they may only exist in relation to real targets, at least in regards to 
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video games.  The original cases for rejecting the first two claims consider too few 
examples to fully understand how exactly we are involved with fictions.  When we use 
video games to study how our avatars can be the prototypical example of how we involve 
with every fiction the worries about our involvement dissipates. This leads us to restate 
the third part of the triad in a way that does not seem so inconsistent. Rather it tracks our 
feelings about when we are and are not feeling real emotions. And, this is good because 
we intuitively seem to have very powerful emotional responses when we interact with 
fictions that are important to us. In fact, the aesthetic value of a fiction is usually directly 
related to what it makes us feel in response to its world. 
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